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1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a controversy that involves the law of insurance. On August 18, 2007 
Michael Brookbank was driving southbound on 3500 East in Twin Falls County when a 
dog ran out into the road from the driveway of M. Wilmoth Kinsey's residence and 
collided with Mr. Brookbank's motorcycle:' (R. 55). Mr. Brookbank crashed and 
sustained personal injuries. Id. The dog was owned by Jamey Kinsey, M. Wilmoth 
Kinsey's grandson. Id. The central issue in this case is whether Jamey Kinsey is a 
"resident" of his grandmother's household in order to determine if there is insurance 
coverage for Jamey Kinsey. If Jamey Kinsey is not covered then he is judgment proof. 
6. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND DISPOSITION 
On October 1, 2007 Michael Brookbank filed a complaint against Jamey Kinsey 
to recover the damages he sustained from the collision which occurred on August 18, 
2007. (R.54). On April 14, 2008, M. Wilmoth Kinsey's insurance company, Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farm Bureau") filed a verified complaint 
seeking a declaratory judgment that Jamey Kinsey was not an "insured" under his 
grandmother's insurance policy and that Farm Bureau was not obligated to defend 
Jamey Kinsey. (R.8). In its verified complaint, Farm Bureau alleged that at the time of 
the incident Jamey Kinsey was staying in an outbuilding located at 3497 East 3000 
North in Kimberly, Idaho; this is his grandmother's address. (R.8). 
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PlaintiffiAppellant Michael Brookbank became aware of Farm Bureau's complaint 
for declaratory judgment and sought to intervene in that case. Mr. Brookbank filed a 
motion to intervene in the declaratory action. (R.4). The parties eventually stipulated to 
allow Mr. Brookbank to intervene. (R.4). Shortly thereafter Farm Bureau filed a motion 
for summary judgment. Jamey Kinsey did not file a memorandum in opposition. Instead, 
Mr. Brookbank filed a cross motion for summary judgment asserting that Jamey Kinsey 
was a resident of M. Wilmoth's household at the time of the incident and therefore was 
covered as an "insured under the insurance policy. 
On June 8, 2009 the district court heard oral argument on the cross motions for 
summary judgment. On June 10, 2009 the court issued its written opinion on the cross 
motions. (R. 124). The court held that Jamey Kinsey was not a "resident" of M. 
Wilmoth's household and as such he was not covered under the Farm Bureau policy. 
(R. 138). Plaintiff Michael Brookbank filed this instant appeal seeking a reversal of the 
lower court's erroneous decision. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wilmoth Kinsey is the named insured on the Farm Bureau policy that is at issue 
in this case. (R. 128). Wilmoth Kinsey's residence is located at 3497 East 3000 North, 
Kimberly, Idaho. (R. 99). Wilmoth is also the grandmother of Jamey Kinsey. (R. 115). 
There are approximately four houses located on the property described as 3497 
East 3000 North in Kimberly, Idaho ("Kinsey Farm"). (R. 100). Wilmoth Kinsey's 
children and their families resided in the houses on the property. (R. 107-2). Jamey 
Kinsey grew up on the Kinsey Farm where he lived with his father after his parents' 
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divorce in 1972. (R. 105,115). After graduating from high school he worked for Terry 
Hollifield for 2 -3 years and lived in the bunkhouse on his grandmother's farm. (R.115). 
Between 1990 and 1992 Jamey was enlisted in the Navy, presumably away from home. 
(R.115). After he got out of the Navy in 1992, Jamey returned to Kimberly and went to 
CSI and also worked on the farm. (R.115). Between 1997 and 2001 Jamey worked in 
the oil fields in Colorado, he "bounced all over the country," and at one point lived with 
his mother in Texas. (R.115). Afterward, Jamey left Texas and returned home to ldaho 
sometime around 2001. (R.115). When he returned to ldaho he lived in the house with 
his grandmother, Wilmoth Kinsey. (R . l l l ) .  
On August 18, 2007 Mr. Brookbank collided with Mr. Kinsey's dog on 3500 ~ a s t ,  
a country road located in Twin Falls County, ldaho. (R.119). Jamey Kinsey was staying 
in an outbuilding located at the Kinsey Farm when Mr. Brookbank collided with the dog. 
(R. 8). In fact, on August 18, 2007, Jamey was at his grandmother's house looking for a 
pair of his work boots. (R.72). At the time of the accident, deputies from the Twin Falls 
County Sheriff's Office were called to the scene of the accident in response to a 91 1 call 
made by Jamey Kinsey. (R.73). The police officers generated an accident report that 
listed "Jamey Kinsey" as the owner of the dog, Jamey's address on the report was listed 
as 3497 East 3000 North, Kimberly, Idaho. (R.92). 
Additionally, Jamey kept his personal property in his grandmother's bunkhouse 
or in her home. (R.71). Jamey's grandmother also safeguarded Jamey's money, paid 
his bills and ensured that he keeps his vehicle registration current. (R.74). Jamey's 
vehicle title and registration lists his address as "3497 East 3000 North, Kimberly, 
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Idaho." (R.94). Furthermore, Jamey's driver's license lists his address as "3497 East 
3000 North, Kimberly, Idaho." In fact, Jamey's discovery response lists Jamey's address 
as "3497 E 3000 N, Kimberly, ID 83341." (R.61). 
The only time Jamey Kinsey has ever stated a different address was at his 
deposition held on November 3, 2008 when he stated that his address was "333 Rock 
Creek Road, Hansen, Idaho" - the same address as his girlfriend (R.67). At that 
deposition, Jamey was asked why he did not want to concede that his address was his 
grandmother's address, Jamey replied: "That's the truth. Yeah, the Kinsey ranch had 
nothing to do with this, at all, whatsoever. And I know you're after the insurance out 
there, so that's just not kosher."(~.74). 
I I .  
ISSUESPRESENTEDOIVAPPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in resolving the "resident" ambiguity in the insurance 
contract in favor of insurer Farm Bureau? 
I ~ I .  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court is asked to review the district court's ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment. This Court employs the same standard employed by the district court when 
originally ruling on the motion. Farmers Insurance Go. of ldaho v. Talbot, 133 ldaho 
428, 431 (Idaho 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. 
Generally, this Court and the district court liberally construe the record in favor of the 
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party opposing the motion for summary judgment and draws all reasonable inferences 
and conclusions in favor of that party. 
This Court has addressed the issue of insurance coverage, holding that: 
"Under certain clear cut factual patterns the determination of whether la 
person] is, for the purposes of insurance coveraqe, a resident, is a 
Question of law." 
AID insurance Co (Mutual) v. Armstrong, 119 ldaho 897, 900 (Ct. App. 1991) citing 
Government Employees lnsurance Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672,677 (Utah 1982). 
I When presented with questions of law, this Court has held that 
I "[it] exercises free review and is not bound by findings of the district court, 
I but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented." 
Farmers, 133 ldaho at 431. Therefore, this Court exercises free review to determine 
whether Jamey Kinsey was a "resident" of his grandmother's household for purposes of 




A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FARM BUREAU'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THAT BASIS THAT MR. KINSEY HAD 
CHANGED HIS RESIDENCE. 
The central dispute in this case is whether Jamey Kinsey was a resident of his 
grandmother's household at time that Mr. Brookbank collided with Mr. Kinsey's dog. If 
Jamey was a resident of his grandmother's household then he is covered by his 
grandmother's insurance policy. Alternatively, if he is not a resident of her household 
then he is not eligible for insurance coverage. 
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B. AMBIGUITIES IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS MUST BE RESOLVED IN 
FAVOR OF COVERAGE. 
  he insurance contract between Farm Bureau and Wilmoth Kinsey provides that 
for purposes of coverage, an "insured" means "you or the entity named in the 
Declarations" and "if you are an individual, insured also means, if residents of your 
household, your spouse, your relatives, or minors in the care of you or your relatives." 
(R.18). The contract does not define the terms "residents of your household." These 
terms are ambiguous. 
As a general rule, "courts interpret the phrase 'resident of the same household' to 
extend coverage if this can be done under a reasonable interpretation of the facts." AID 
Insurance Co., v. Armstrong, 11 9 Idaho 897, 901 (Ct. App. 1991). This Court has held 
that 
"If anv doubt exists the language of the policy will be interpreted aaainst 
the insurance companv and in favor of coveraae. Id. If an insurance policy 
may be given either of two reasonable meanings, one which permits 
recovery and one which does not, the meaning of the more-favorable to 
the insured should be adopted.'' 
Id (internal cites omitted) (emphasis added). Clearly, policy favors the adoption of a 
reasonable meaning which permits coverage. 
The term "resident" is subject to multiple meanings. On the one hand "resident" 
may mean "a member of a family living at that home permanently as one unit headed by 
[one member] for their mutual interest and social happiness." See Hardware Mutual 
Casualty Co. v. Home Indemnity Co., 241 Cal.App.2d 303, 306 (Cal.App.Dist.1 1966). 
Although not explicitly stated, this seems to be 'the definition propounded by Farm 
Bureau. On the other hand, the term "resident" may simply require that the "relative 
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reside in the household not that he live there permanently as a member of the family." 
Id. 
Webster's Dictionary defines "resident" as "living in a place for some length of 
time," "resident" also means "not migratory." Thus, a "resident of the same household is 
"one, other than a temporary or transient visitor, who lives with others in the same 
house for a period of some duration, although he may not intend to remain there 
permanently." Hardware, 241 Cal.App.2d at 310. This definition is consistent with this 
Court's definition of "resident" in Allsfafe Insurance Co. v. Mocaby. 133 Idaho 593, 598 
(Idaho 1999). In Mocaby this Court held that the term "resident" connotes a living 
arrangement with some degree of permanence." Id. If these is some degree ol 
permanence then one is no longer a temporary or transient visitor, rather the person is a 
resident even if he does not plan to remain at that location permanently. . 
In Mocaby the insurer brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its policy 
did not provide liability coverage for the insureds' grandson's allegedly accidental 
shooting of the victim. Id at 595. In that case the grandson went to live with his 
grandparents after the grandparents were contacted by the Department of Health and 
Welfare. Id. After the grandson arrived he spent approximately 2 days with his 
grandparents and then left the house to stay with some friends. Id. The grandson would 
occasionally return to his grandparents' house for a shower, a change of clothes and a 
meal. However, he would then leave again to be with his friends. Approximately two 
months after his arrival, the grandson allegedly shot a woman in the head at her home 
with a gun he'd stolen from a friend. Id. 
APPEALLANT BRIEF - 7 
The Mocaby Court adopted an objective test for determining "residency" relying 
on objective factors rather than subjective testimony. The Court considered the 
individual's storage of personal belongs in the named insured's household; custody 
arrangements for the minor; the presence or absence of a close continuing connection 
between the individual and the insured; the presence of a bedroom kept for the 
individual's visits to the household; and the intent of the named insured with respect to 
the individual's residence. Id at 598. Ultimately the Mocaby Court held that the factors 
weighed against finding that the grandson was a resident of his grandparents' 
household. 
However, the California Court of Appeals found coverage in a case with facts 
almost identical to the facts in this case. In Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Home 
Indemnity Co., the California Court of Appeals held that the nephew was a resident of 
his aunt and uncle's household for the purposes of insurance coverage. 241 Cal.App.2d 
303, 304 (Cal.App.Dist.1, 1996). In Hardware, the nephew (Bowens) was involved in a 
motor vehicle collision in which the plaintiff was injured. The aunt and uncle's insurance 
company appealed a determination that it was liable for defending the nephew because 
he was an additional insured on his aunt and uncle's policy. Id at 305-6. 
Prior to the accident Bowens and his cousin shared an apartment in Oakland. 
Shortly thereafter Bowens' cousin joined the Navy and his cousin's room in his parents' 
house was no longer occupied. Id at 309. Approximately 2 weeks before the motor 
vehicle collision, Bowens was working in his uncle's garage tinkering with a car trying lo 
get it to work. Id. He slept in his aunt and uncle's house the day before the accident. Id 
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at 309. He was also unemployed at the time. Id. Additionally Bowens had some clothes 
with him but most of them were still in the Oakland apartment. l d a f  310. After the motor 
vehicle collision, Bowens stayed at his aunt and uncle's house in Richmond for a period 
of 2 weeks after the accident before returning to the apartment. The motor vehicle 
collision was investigated by a police officer. Id at 310. The officer testified that when he 
spoke with Bowens and asked him where he lived the latter gave him the address in 
Richmond. The court inferred that Bowens also had the Richmond address listed on his 
driver's license since the officer asked to see Bowens' license and registration. Id. 
Additionally, when Bowens arrived at the hospital he gave the hospital his aunt and 
uncle's telephone number. Four days after the accident a licensed investigator arrived 
at the Richmond address to speak with Bowens; when asked for his address Bowens 
again gave his aunt and uncle's Richmond address. Id, The investigator also noticed 
that the vehicle registration for a car parked in front of the Richmond address showed 
that Bowens was the owner and that his address was his aunt and uncle's Richmond 
address. Id at 31 1. 
Based on these facts the court held that Bowens was a resident of his aunt and 
uncle's household even though he still had an apartment in Oakland. Id at 31 1. These 
facts taken together evidenced that Bowens was not merely a transient visitor; on the 
contrary, it establishes a close continuous contact between the insureds and the 
individual sufficient enough to establ~sh that Bowens was in fact a resident of the 
insureds' household. 
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C. A PERSON MAY BE A RESIDENT OF MULTIPLE HOUSEHOLDS FOR 
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
A person, whether a minor or an adult, may be a resident of more than one 
household for insurance purposes. AID lnsurance Co., v. Armstrong, 119 Idaho at 902 
citing Mutual Service Casualty lnsurance Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621 
(Minn.App.1987). For example, in Olson the insurance company appealed the trial 
court's holding that a child was a resident of his mother's household when the child 
primarily resided with his father who had custody of the child. Olson, 402 N.W.2d at 
621. The insurance company argued that the child could have only one residency and 
since the father had custody the child could only be the resident of his father's 
household. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected that argument holding that: 
"...as a general rule, while a person can have only one domicile, he can 
have more than one residence. 28 C.J.S. Domicile 5 2(a) (1941). We see 
no reason why a person who meets the criteria for being considered a 
resident of an insured's household should be precluded from coverage 
solely because he is also a resident of another household." 
Olson, 402 N.W.2d at 621 (emphasis added). 
The district court failed to consider the fact that an individual such as Jamey 
Kinsey may have multiple residences so long as he meets the criteria for being 
considered a resident. To the contrary, the district court operated under the premise that 
an individual may have only one residency and in fact held that Jamey had changed his 
residency. In reality Jamey was a resident of two households. Furthermore, contrary to 
the district court's holding, ~ a m e y  Kinsey met the criteria for being considered a resident 
of his grandmother's household. 
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This case is in many ways nearly identical to the Hardware case referenced 
above. There is no question that Jamey was a resident of his grandmother's household 
when he was growing up. On August 18, 2007, the date of the incident, it is conceded 
that Jamey was staying at an outbuilding located at his grandmother's property. In 
addition to that, Jamey kept his property at that same location, including his money. 
This fact illustrates that there was a close relationship between Jamey and the insured. 
That fact also indicates that Jamey was not simply a temporary or transient visitor; 
rather it is an indication that Jamey was a resident of his grandmother's household. 
Jamey's grandmother also paid his bills and made sure that his vehicle 
registration remains current. Again, this illustrates that Jamey is not merely a temporary 
and transient visitor; he and his grandmother have established a living arrangement 
where there is in fact a degree of permanency. in addition, Jamey stored his worldly 
possessions at his grandmother's home which is indicative of trust between the parties 
which is present in close and personal relationship between the parties. In fact, at the 
time of the incident Jamey was looking for his work boot's at the house where he had left 
them. The inference is that Jamey believed that his work boots were likely to be at his 
grandmother's along with all his other property. 
Furthermore, on August 18, 2007, police officers responded to the accident. At 
some point the officers spoke to Jamey because under the section identified as 
"property damage" the report requires the officer to identify the name of the object that 
was struck and the owner's name and address. The report identifies the object that was 
struck as an animal owned by Jamey Kinsey whose address was "3497 East 3000 
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North, Kimberly, ID 83341 ." Like the officer in Hardware, the police officer in this case 
would have had to make contact with Jamey Kinsey at the time of the accident to elicit 
that information from him. 
Jamey also listed his grandmother's address as his own on his driver's license 
and vehicle registration. Had Jamey considered his girlfriend's house as his own he 
would have changed the address on his driver's license. By listing his grandmother's 
address on his own on his driver's license and registration, Jamey announced to the 
public and to the relevant state agencies that he believed himself to reside at that 
address. These facts taken together are sufficient to show that Jamey was not merely a 
temporary or transient visitor in his grandmother's household, rather it shows that there 
was a living arrangement between the two which had some degree of permanency. 
Therefore, Jamey was a "resident" of his grandmother's household under one definition 
of the term "resident." Consequently, the district court erred in holding that Jamey was 
not a resident of his grandmother's household because he had changed his residence. 
Moreover, this court has recognized that a person may have multiple residences 
for purposes of insurance coverage . This is true in the instant case. Although Jamey 
may produce enough subjective statements to establish that he maintains a residence 
at his girlfriend's house, the objective facts also support the conclusion that Jamey was 
a resident of his grandmother's household as well. In Hardware, defendant Bowens 
maintained an apartment in a different city yet that fact did not prevent the court from 
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finding that he was nonetheless a resident of his aunt and uncle's household. 
Residency does not require long-term permanence. As such the district court erred in 
holding that the facts do not support the conclusion that Jamey Kinsey was a resident of 
his grandmother's household. 
D. CONCLUSION. 
It is clear that ambiguous terms such as "resident" are to be construed in favor of 
providing insurance coverage if there are different rational meanings for the term. In this 
I case the Appellant contends that one rational definition of a "resident" is a person, other 
I than a temporary or transient visitor, who lives with others in the same house for a 
! 
period of some duration, although he may not intend to remain there permanently. 
When a'person is not a transient or temporary visitor in the insured's household then a 
I living arrangement with some degree of permanence exists. That type of living 
arrangement was present in this case. Jamey Kinsey lived at his grandmother's home at 
the date of the incident, as he had done other times in h is  past. Jamey stored his 
personal belongings and his money at'his grandmother's. His grandmother paid his bills 
and made sure he kept his vehicle registration current. Jamey also listed his 
grandmother's address as his own on his driver's license, his vehicle registration, and in 
his discovery responses. Lastly, he communicated to the officer on the date of the 
incident that his address was "3497 East 3000 North, Kimberly, Idaho 83341." These 
facts show that Jamey was more than a mere transient visitor - he was a resident of 
Wilmoth Kinsey's household. 
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Consequently, the Appellant respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
district court's ruling and hold that Jamey Kinsey was a resident of his grandmother's 
household for purpose of insurance coverage 
DATED this 24th day of September, 2009. 
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